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Science and Ethics in Conducting, Analyzing, and
Reporting Social Science Research: Implications
for Social Scientists, Judges, and Lawyers
ROBERT ROSENTHAL*
PETER DAVID BLANCK*
INTRODUCTION
This Article describes a number of scientific, ethical, and legal issues
relevant to conducting, analyzing, and reporting social science research. Legal
literature has devoted little attention to examining the scientific and ethical
issues in evaluating empirical social science research. This is particularly
troubling in light of the fact that empirical research is presented with
increasing regularity to judges and juries as trial evidence.'
There is a strong relationship between the ethics, the scientific quality, and
the evidentiary importance of the way social science research is conducted,
analyzed, and reported. Everything else being equal, social science research
of higher scientific quality is likely to be more ethically defensible and more
relevant to the resolution of a legal dispute. The higher the quality of the
research program, the better invested has been the time of the research
participants, the funds of the granting agency, and the space of the journals
that report the results, as well as the general investment that a legal fact
finder (that is, a judge or jury) has made in evaluating the importance of the
* Professor of Social Psychology, Harvard University. Ph.D., 1956, UCLA. Robert Rosenthal's
preparation of this Article was supported in part by the Spencer Foundation.
** Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law; Senior Fellow, The Annenberg
Washington Program. Ph.D., 1982, Harvard University; LD., 1986, Stanford University. The authors
thank Michael Saks for his comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Peter David Blanck's preparation
of this Article was supported in part by The Annenberg Washington Program.
1. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Court Hears Case on Science RulesN.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 31, 1993,
at AI9 (reporting U.S. Supreme Court's difficulty in deciding when scientific theory is sound enough
to be admitted into evidence when it heard oral arguments in Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., No. 92-102 (U.S. argued Mar. 30, 1993)); Communicating with Juries, Panel One: Judge-Jury
Communications: Improving Communications and Understanding Bias, The Annenberg Washington
Program Conference, April 10, 1992, 68 IND. L.L 1037, 1042 (1993) (statement of Robert Rosenthal)
(cautioning against accepting results of one study without looking at results of similar studies).
For examples of discussions of the legal relevance of research methodology and ethics, see JOHN
MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW (1989); Peter D. Blanck, Empirical Study
of the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Methods, Preliminary Findings,
and Implications, 22 N.M. L. REV. 119 (1992); Peter D. Blanck, On Integrating Persons with Mental
Retardation: The ADA and ADR, 22 N.M. L. Rv. 259 (1992); Peter D. Blanck, The Emerging Work
Force: Empirical Study of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 16 J. CORP. L. 693 (1991).
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research to the resolution of a dispute. The lower the research quality, the less
justified the researcher is in wasting not only the research participant's time,
but also the funding agency's money, the journal's space, and the court's
time.
Part I of this Article explores several scientific, ethical, and legal issues
related to conducting social science research. Part II then highlights the
importance to social scientists and to the legal community of viewing the
analysis of empirical social science data as tied to the ethics of conducting
research. Finally, Part III discusses how the reporting of social science
research, whether in professional journals or in the courtroom, has implica-
tions for social scientists and for the evaluation of research in the adversarial
process.
I. SCIENTIFIC, ETHICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
CONDUCTING SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
This Part explores several considerations of research design-that is, the
methods and procedures employed in a study-and recruitment of human
research participants. In evaluating the ethical employment of human
participants, issues of safety can be distinguished from more subtle issues of
research ethics.2 Research that is unsafe for participants is ethically question-
able. Perfectly "safe" research, however, which puts no participant at risk,
also may be ethically questionable because of the shortcomings of the design.
A. Issues of Design
Imagine that a court or jury in a school desegregation case is to evaluate as
evidence the results of a research project. The study hypothesizes that private
schools improve children's intellectual functioning more than public schools.
In the study, children from selected private and public schools are tested
extensively The research hypothesis is examined by comparing scores earned
by students from private versus public schools.
Assume that the safety of the children tested is not at issue. It can be
argued, however, that the school research raises important ethical issues
because of the inadequacy of its design. The study's goal is to determine the
causal impact on student performance of private versus public schooling.
2. Peter D. Blanck et al., Scientific Rewards and Conflicts of Ethical Choices in Human Subjects
Research, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 959 (1992); Thomas Grisso et al., Standards in Research: APA s
Mechanismfor Monitorng the Challenges, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 758 (1991) (discussing ethical issues
studied by the American Psychological Association's Committee on Standards in Research).
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However, the research design does not permit reasonable causal inference
because of the absence of randomization or a reasonable attempt to consider
plausible rival hypotheses.3
How does the poor quality of the hypothetical school study design raise
ethical and legal objections to the proposed research? The ethical objections
stem in part from the fact that students', teachers', and administrators' time
will have been taken from potentially more beneficial educational experiences.
In the context of an adversarial process, the problem is that the poorly
designed study is likely to lead to unwarranted and inaccurate conclusions by
a fact finder.4 Had the hypothetical research question been appropriate to the
research design, the ethical and evidentiary issues would have been less acute.
For example, if the investigators had set out only to learn whether perfor-
mance differences exist between students in private versus public schools,
their design would have been perfectly appropriate to their question.
B. Issues of Recruitment
Much attention has been devoted to considering a variety of ethical issues
in the selection and recruitment of human participants in social science
research. 5 The following comments address the implications of participant
selection and recruitment choices for the use of social science research in the
courtroom.
First, based on several reviews of the literature, it has been shown that a
number of research methods or procedures may be designed to reduce
participant volunteer bias. In other words, certain research methods may
actually increase the generality or external validity6 of social science research
results.7 To provide one example, the external validity of psychological
3. THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS
ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 341-83 (1979).
4. In addition, the time and money allocated to poor quality science serve to keep those finite
resources of time and money from better quality science in an undeniably zero-sum world.
5. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH WITH
HUMAN PARTICIPANTS (1982); see also HERBERT C. KELAN, A TIME TO SPEAK: ON HUMAN VALUES
AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 202-25 (1968); Blanck et al., supra note 2, at 962-63; Gnsso et al., supra note
2, at 760-61.
6. "External validity is the problem of interpreting the difference, the problem of generalization.
To what other populations, occasions, stimulus objects, and measures may the obtained results be
applied?" EUGENE J. WEBB ET AL., UNOBTRUSIVE MEASURES: NONREACTivE RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 10-il (1966) (emphasis in original).
7. ROBERT ROSENTHAL & RALPH L. RoSNOW, ESSENTIALS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH: METHODS
AND DATA ANALYSIS 228-29 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter ESSENTIALS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH];
ROBERT ROSENTHAL & RALPH L. ROSNOw, THE VOLUNTEER SUBjECT 119-20 (1975) [hereinafter THE
VOLUNTEER SUBJECT]; RALPH L. ROSNOw & ROBERT ROSENTHAL, BEGINNING BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH:
A CONCEPTUAL PRIMER (1993) [hereinafter BEGINNING BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH].
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research on jurors' comprehension of pattern instructions in a death penalty
case in a particular jurisdiction may be enhanced substantially by employing
research methods that maximize the recruitment of potential jurors from that
jury pool.8
Employment of procedures that enhance the generality of research results
has also led some social scientists to view human research participants as yet
another "granting agency," which, in reality, they are, since research
participants must decide whether to grant social scientists their time, attention,
and cooperation.9 Treating research participants as another granting agency
also provides the researcher incentives to give participants more information
about the long-term benefits of the research.
In giving prospective participants enhanced information about the
study-and ultimately its findings and conclusions-social scientists, expert
witnesses, and legal practitioners should avoid "hyperclaiming" or overstating
the implications of the research. An example of hyperclaiming might be an
attempt by an expert witness to convey to a fact finder that the results of a
research project are likely to demonstrate broader conclusions than, in fact,
they are likely to reflect-as might happen in the hypothetical school
study 'o
Presumably, through the adversarial process-the presentation of experts on
both sides-fact finders are able to evaluate research claims and hyperclaims
fairly well." Absent more systematic information about research design and
method, however, fact finders may not be able to fully evaluate research
claims. Therefore, one component of the researcher's ethical obligation may
be to explain to the participants and to a fact finder what the research can
actually accomplish. Again, in the hypothetical school study, this approach
contrasts with the claim that the research may demonstrate the superiority of
private over public schooling.
Closely related to the phenomenon of hyperclaiming is the phenomenon of
"causism." Causism refers to the tendency to imply a causal relationship
where none has been established, that is, where the research data do not
support it. Understanding the nature of causism is particularly important to the
presentation of social science research in the courtroom. This is because one
party typically presents one study to evidence a cause-and-effect relationship,
8. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 806 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. I1. 1992) (vacating death
penalty on grounds that jurors did not comprehend pattern instructions).
9. See, e.g., THE VOLUNTEER SUBJECT, supra note 7.
10. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
11. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Kreiling, Scientific Evidence: Toward Providing the Lay Trier with the
Comprehensible and Reliable Evidence Necessary to Meet the Goals of the Rules of Evidence, 32 ARIZ.
L. REv. 915, 929-35 (1990).
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while the opposing party tries to demonstrate the opposite with a different
study.
The following chargicteristics of causism are relevant to the discussion here:
(a) the absence of an appropriate evidentiary base supporting the causal
inference;
(b) the presence of language directly implying cause; for example, "the
effect of," "the impact of," "the consequence of," or "as a result,"
where more appropriate language would have been "is related to,"
"is predictable from," or "may be inferred from", and
(c) the self-serving benefits to the "causist" (e.g., social scientist
or legal proponent).
As a general matter, causism is self-serving because it makes the causist's
result appear more important or fundamental to a fact finder than it really is.
Cases in which causism is present, yet its perpetrator (for example, the expert
witness) is unaware of the causism, reflect poor scientific training or legal
preparation. Voir dire of experts at trial may be one way to focus increasingly
on the nature of self-serving causism.'
Where causism is found, and its perpetrator is aware of the causism, it
reflects unethical misrepresentation and deception, either to the scientific
community or to the fact finder. The expert witness caught perpetrating
causism during testimony has likely dealt a fatal blow to his or her credibility
before a fact finder.1
3
Whereas well-trained social scientists can readily differentiate causist
language from inferentially more accurate language, research participants,
policy makers, and fact finders ordinarily cannot. Additionally, when a
proposed research study is described in causal language, it may often
represent an unfair participant recruitment device. This recruitment approach
is at best inaccurate, when employed out of ignorance, and at worst dishonest,
when employed as hype to increase participation rates. One consequence of
this knowledge for trial attorneys is to invite more careful probing of the
testifying expert's evaluation of research participation, of participant drop-out
rates in the evaluation of the generalizability of a study's results, and of its
subsequent usefulness to the fact finder.
12. Cf. FED. R. EvID. 702 (providing for when an expert witness may testify in the form of
opinion).
13. Of course, the broader ethical question raised by deliberate use of causism exists independent
of the perpetrator being caught.
1993] 1213
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C. Bad Science Makes for Bad Ethics
Causism is only one example of how social scientists and attorneys can use
bad science to misrepresent research results to a finder of fact. Additionally,
poor quality of research design, poor quality of data analysis, and poor quality
of research reporting lessen both the ethical justification and legal relevance
of any research project. This applies not only where deception, discomfort, or
embarrassment of the participants is involved but, in many cases, to the most
benign research experience for participants.
If, because of the poor quality of the science, no benefit can come of the
research study, how are social scientists to justify the use of participants' time
and effort, and the money, space, and other resources that have been expended
on the research project? Likewise, how are trial attorneys to justify the
presentation of bad science at trial? When we add the inescapable zero-sum
nature of time, attention, effort, money, and other resources to the "no good
can come of it" argument, it becomes difficult to justify poor quality research
on any ethical or professional basis. 4 It also becomes increasingly difficult
for attorneys to justify the presentation of bad science to a finder of fact. One
reason, among others, is that such presentation conflicts with the attorney's
code of professional responsibility "
Poor research quality makes for poor quality of education as well. This is
true especially where student participant pools are employed so that
participation is quasi-coercive. In fact, the use of such pools is typically
justified by the fact that participants will benefit educationally
But if individuals are required to participate in poor quality research, they
are likely to acquire only misconceptions about the nature of the science. To
stay with the school study hypothetical, if the personality scale scores for
student participants from public and private schools are correlated with their
14. Elsewhere, we have argued that Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) must consider the technical
scientific competence of the investigators whose proposals they are asked to evaluate. That will increase
the work required of IRB members and change their composition somewhat to include a degree of
methodological expertise. Even then it will not always be easy to come to a decision about the scientific
competence of the investigator and of the particular proposal; but then, it is not always easy to come
to a decision about the more directly ethical aspects of the proposal either. See Robert Rosenthal,
Science and Ethics in Conducting, Analyzing, and Reporting Psychological Research, Presentation at
the Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 15, 1992); see also
Ralph L. Rosnow et al., The Institutional Review Board as a Mirror of Scientific and Ethical Standards,
48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST (forthcoming 1993) (discussing costs of doing and of not doing research).
15. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983) (requiring that lawyers'
claims and contentions be meritonus); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1)
(1968) (prohibiting a lawyer from taking an unwarranted action merely to harass or maliciously injure
another); FED. R. Civ. P 11; see also infra note 36.
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SAT scores or their course grades, and they are then told that "this research
is designed to learn the impact of personality on cognitive functioning," they
have been poorly served educationally as part of having been misled
scientifically The same would hold true for the fact finder presented with bad
science.
D. Costs and Utilities of Doing or Not Doing Research
When social scientists are confronted with a questionable research proposal,
they ordinarily employ a cost-utility analysis. In such an analysis, the costs
of doing a study include the possible negative effects on participants, time,
money, effort, and other resources. These are evaluated simultaneously against
such utilities as benefits to participants, to other people at other times, to
science, to the investigator, or to the resolution of a particular legal
dispute. 6 The potential benefits of higher quality studies and research
addressing more important topics exceed the potential benefits of lower
quality studies and studies addressing less important topics. Of course, what
constitutes an "important" study is open to considerable debate.
Elsewhere, this type of cost-utility analysis has been diagrammed as a two-
dimensional plane in which costs are one dimension and utilities the other. 7
Any study with high utility and low cost should likely be carried out.
Conversely, any study with low utility and high cost should not be carried out.
Studies in which costs approximate utilities are more difficult to evaluate.
The cost-utility model, however, is often insufficient to answer questions
of whether to conduct the study because this calculus fails to consider the
costs and utilities of not conducting a particular study '8 The failure to
conduct a study that could be conducted is as much an act to be evaluated on
ethical grounds as is the conducting of a study For instance, the research
group that could find a cancer preventive, but feels the work would be dull
and a distraction,from their major interest is making a decision that is to be
evaluated on ethical grounds. This decision is as surely an ethical decision as
is the decision of a researcher to investigate tumors with a procedure that
16. See, e.g., Peter D. Blanck, The "Process" of Field Research in the Courtroom: A Descriptive
Analysis, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337,345-46(1987) (discussing how judges' behavior affects jurors).
17. Robert Rosenthal & Ralph L. Rosnow, Applying Hamlet's Question to the Ethical Conduct of
Research: A Conceptual Addendum, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 561,562 (1984); BEGINNING BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, supra note 7; ESSENTIALS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 7, at 232; Ralph L.
Rosnow, Teaching Research Ethics Through Role-Play and Discussion, 17 TEACHING OF PSYCHOL. 179,
181 (1990).
18. Rosenthal & Rosnow, supra note 17; BEGINNING BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 7;
ESSENTIALS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 7; Rosnow et al., supra note 14.
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carries a high risk to human participants. Similarly, the hypothetical school
researcher whose study might help reduce violence, racism, or sexism, but
who refuses to conduct the study because it involves deception, has not solved
an ethical problem. This researcher has only traded one ethical dilemma for
another.
These ideas relating to ethical tradeoffs have been applied with great
eloquence by the late Professor John Kaplan of the Stanford University Law
School.19 The context of his remarks was that of the use of animals in
research and of the efforts of "animal rights" activists to chip away "at our
ability to afford animal research. [I]t is impossible to know the costs of
experiments not done or research not undertaken. Who speaks for the sick, for
those in pain, and for the future?"2 To extend Kaplan's point to the
adversarial context, the cost of relying on bad or inadequate research (or on
hypothetical findings) raises important ethical questions concerning the
usefulness of social science research that is subsequently presented in the
courts.
In the preceding examples, the costs of failing to conduct research have
accrued to future generations (or to future legal disputes) or to present
generations not including the research participants themselves. But sometimes
incidental benefits to research participants are so important that they must be
considered in the calculus of "good science."
An example helps to illustrate the point. The first author was asked once to
testify before an Institutional Review Board about the implications of his
studies on interpersonal expectations for the ethics of a proposed project on
karyotyping (that is, the characteristics of cell structure). The proposed study
was designed to test young children for the presence of the XYY chromo-
some, which had been hypothesized to be associated with criminal behavior.
The participating children would be studied until adulthood, so that the
correlation between chromosome type and criminal behavior could be
determined. The first author was asked to testify about his research on
interpersonal expectancy effects because it was believed that the proposed
project should be conducted "double-blind," that is, it was suggested that the
participants and the researchers should not be told the results of the
chromosome analysis. This method was believed to be important because of
the possibility that the parents' or researchers' expectations for increased
19. John Kaplan, The Use of Ammals in Research, 242 SCIENCE 839, 839-40 (1988).
20. Id. at 839.
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criminal behavior by the XYY males might in fact become a self-fulfilling
prophecy 2
A double-blind design should have solved that problem, but the Institutional
Review Board decided not to permit the research. The Board did not consider
the costs to the participants themselves or to their families of not doing the
study What were those costs? The costs were the loss of twenty years of free,
high-quality pediatric care to children whose parents could never have
afforded any high-quality pediatric care. Was it an ethically defensible
decision to deprive hundreds of children of medical care that they would
otherwise not have received to avoid a double-blind design that had little
potential for actually harming the participants? At the very least, these costs
of failing to do the research should have received a fuller discussion.
II. DATA ANALYSIS AS AN ETHICAL ARENA AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN THE COURTROOM
This Part explores several of the ethical and legal consequences of the
analysis of social science data. Issues discussed here relate to data-dropping
choices, subject and variable selection procedures, and the importance of
meta-analytic techniques to the presentation of research results in the
courtroom.
A. Data Dropping
Ethical issues in the analysis of data range from the obvious to the subtle.
Probably the most obvious and serious transgression in data analysis is the
analysis of fabricated data. Perhaps more frequent is the dropping of data that
contradict the data analyst's theory, prediction, or commitment. This strategy
of data rejection warrants discussion, as it has impprtant implications for the
potential usefulness of a social science study in the adversarial context.
There is a venerable tradition in data analysis of dealing with outliers, or
extreme scores, a tradition going back over 200 years.2 2 Both technical and
ethical issues are involved. The technical issues relate to the best ways of
dealing with outliers without reference to the implications for the tenability
of the data analyst's theory or hypothesis. The ethical issues have to do with
21. For more on expectancy and the use of double-blind tests, see ROBERT ROSENTHAL,
EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 367-68 (expanded ed. 1976); ROBERT ROSENTHAL
& LENORE JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM 18-19 (expanded ed. 1992).
22. See Vic BARNETT & TOBY LEwIS, OUTLIERS IN STATISTICAL DATA (1978).
12171993]
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the relationship between the data analyst's theory and the choice of method
for dealing with outliers.
Some social science findings suggest that data outliers might be rejected
more often if they contradict the data analyst's theory, but treated less harshly
if they support the data analyst's theory 23 At the very least, when outliers
are rejected, the investigator or the expert testifying about the results of a
study ethically must inform the evaluators of that fact. In addition, it would
be useful for investigators or experts to report the results that would have
been obtained had the outliers not been rejected. In the adversarial setting, if
the proponent expert of the study does not report data-dropping procedures,
certainly, cross-examination should raise this issue.
B. Subject Selection
A different type of data dropping is subject selection, where a subset of the
data is not included in the analysis. Here, too, there are technical and ethical
issues that have implications for the accurate presentation of social science
research in the courtroom.
Often, there may be good technical reasons for setting aside a subset of the
data. For example, a researcher may drop a subset because its size is
especially small or because dropping the subset would make the data more
comparable to some other research. There are, of course, ethical and
evidentiary issues raised when just those subsets are dropped that do not
support the data analyst's or expert's theory or hypotheses. At a minimum,
when subsets of subjects are dropped, social scientists or the fact finder
should be informed of that fact and, potentially, of the results for that
subset.24
C. Variable Selection
Another form of data dropping is variable selection. This is found where the
results for one or more variables are not reported in the journal publication
or to the fact finder. Once again, there are technical and ethical issues that
have implications for the evidentiary value of the research results presented
to a fact finder.
23. Robert Rosenthal & Donald B. Rubin, Pygmalion Reaffirmed, in JANET D. ELASHOFF &
RICHARD E. SNOW, PYGMALION RECONSIDERED 139 app. C (1971); Robert Rosenthal, How Often Are
Our Numbers Wrong?, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1005, 1007 (1978).
24. As part of the trial examination of the expert, it may be important to perform analyses of the
dropped subset data and to present the results to the fact finder.
1218 [Vol. 68:1209
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A simple technical issue would be having more data than the journal editor
or the court will allow to be reported,25 or even than the reviewing body
would be capable of digesting properly 26 In these instances, the social
scientist or expert would be forced to present some of the data. Results would
then often be extrapolated inappropriately or overgeneralized to cases in
which no actual data are considered. For instance, data extrapolation has
occured in cases involving mass torts. In such cases, it is sometimes
impossible to present all the data relating to a class of individuals who are
raising legal claims before a court.27 In prior work, the use of such sampling
procedures in mass trials has been evaluated under several theories of
justice.28 Importantly, sampling and aggregation of data and legal claims,
when done well, may actually produce more precise and reliable trial
outcomes than the justice afforded by more traditional case-by-case determina-
tions.29
As a general matter, it is safe to say that ethical and legal issues are raised
in selecting which data to present, just as when choosing those variables not
to report. This is particularly true in cases where the results are less favorable
to the proponent's theory. At a minimum, when variables are dropped, social
scientists and legal fact finders should be informed of that decision, as well
as of the implications of those decisions.
D. Data Exploitation Can Be Beautiful
That data-dropping and variable selection have ethical and legal implications
is fairly obvious. We turn now to an issue that has ethical and legal
implications that are more subtle. The issue is data exploitation.
Exploiting research participants, students, staff, and colleagues to achieve
certain results is, of course, reprehensible. There is, however, a kind of
exploitation to be cherished by social scientists and fact finders alike: data
exploitation. Social scientists are taught that it is technically improper and
probably unethical to analyze and re-analyze their data in many ways. It is not
proper to snoop around in the data, performing a "fishing expedition."
Likewise, social scientists are taught to test the experimental prediction with
one particular pre-planned statistical test and to take a result significant at the
25. For instance, at some point, repeated presentation of case studies to the trier of fact may be
deemed repetitive.
26. See generally Michael J. Saks & Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits
of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 815 (1992).
27. Id. at 816-21 (discussing the problem of courts having too many cases to try).
28. Id. at 826-41.
29. Id. at 851.
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magic "p less than .05 level"3 as the true finding. In evaluating the
importance of social science research, many lawyers also believe that should
a statistical result not be significant at the .05 level, it is somehow not useful
or relevant to resolving the dispute at hand.
Directly put, the lack of careful and regular attention by social scientists
and lawyers to research findings that do not yield results significant at the .05
level makes for bad science, bad ethics, and uninformed uses of social science
in the courtroom. It makes for bad science because, while snooping does
affect statistical significance or "p" values, it is likely to turn up something
new, interesting, and important.3' It makes for bad ethics because, as
mentioned above, data collection is expensive in terms of time, effort, money,
and other resources, and lawyers' clients are increasingly willing to attest to
this fact. 2 Finally, it makes for uninformed uses of social science research
in the courtroom because the full value of the study and its potential
implications are not presented to the fact finder.
If social science research is worth doing, it is worth analyzing thoroughly
It is worthy of holding up to the light in many different ways so that research
participants, funding agencies, and fact finders get their full value. The
fundamental utility of data exploitation is therefore knowledge gained. About
the only cost of exploitation is the loss of the "sense of sin" over looking at
data for which some null hypothesis3 3 may not have been rejected at the .05
level.3 4 As Tukey pointed out so brilliantly over twenty years ago, social
science would be further ahead if data analysts thought of themselves less as
clergy blessing data with p less than .05 and more as detectives solving
mysteries. 35 The same is often true for lawyers presenting and evaluating
social science research findings in court.36
30. See generally Peter D. Blanck, Calibrating the Scales of Justice: Studying Judge's Behavior in
Jury and Bench Trials, 68 IND. L. J. 1119 (1993).
31. JOHN W TUKEY, EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS (1977).
32. This is particularly true when the client's bill for professional services arrives.
33. The null hypothesis is the hypothesis that there is no relationship between two or more
variables.
34. It is also the loss of our Judeo-Chnstian-Buddhlst guilt and suffering that was designed to be
our lot when p was greater than .05; a suffering that was to be borne as an adult-mature, resigned, and
devout.
35. John W. Tukey, Analyzing Data: Sanctification or Detective Work, 24 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 83
(1969). Before leaving this topic, it should be repeated that snooping in the data can indeed affect the
p value obtained, depending on how the snooping is done. But statistical adjustments can be helpful here
(for example, Bonferrom adjustments). See ESSENTIALS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH supra note 7; Robert
Rosenthal & Donald B. Rubin, Multiple Contrasts and Ordered Bonferront Procedures, 76 J. EDUC.
PSYCHOL. 1028 (1984). Most importantly, replications of the research will be needed-whether the data
were snooped or not.
36. We recognize that lawyers always select evidence to present; that is advocacy. Certainly, it is
not unethical to put forth the client's best case. Yet, for a scientist, the opposite is often true. Analysis
of the parallels and divergences between legal and ethical presentation of evidence raises important
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E. Meta-Analysis as an Ethical Imperative in Presenting
Social Science Research in the Courtroom
Meta-analysis is a set of concepts and procedures employed to summarize
quantitatively any domain of research. 7 We know from statistical and
empirical research that, compared to traditional reviews of the literature,
meta-analytic procedures are more accurate, comprehensive, systematic, and
statistically more powerful."
Meta-analytic procedures use more of the information in the data, thereby
yielding:
(a) more accurate estimates of the overall magnitude of the effect or
relationship being investigated;
(b) more accurate estimates of the overall level of significance of the
entire research domain; and
(c) more useful information about the variables moderating the magni-
tude of the effect or relationship being investigated.
Meta-analysis allows social scientists and fact finders to learn more from
data. Meta-analysis has a unique ability to increase retroactively the benefits
and lessen the costs of the studies being summarized. The costs of time,
attention, and effort of human participants employed in the individual studies
of the meta-analysis are more justified when their data enter into a meta-
analysis. This is because meta-analysis increases the utility of all the
individual studies that are being summarized. Other costs of individual
studies-including funding, investigator time and effort, and other resourc-
es-are similarly more justified because the utility of individual studies is
increased by the strength obtained when information from more studies is
combined in a sophisticated way
issues in itself. For a recent discussion, see Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d
1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992) (No. 92-102) (reviewing ways to evaluate the
admissibility of scientific information); Greenhouse, supra note 1, at A19 (reporting on the oral
arguments to the Supreme Court in Daubert).
37. See generally ROBERT ROsENTHAL, META-ANALYTIC PROCEDURES FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH (rev.
ed. 1991); Robert Rosenthal, Cumulating Psychology: An Appreciation of Donald T. Campbell, 2
PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 213 (1991); see also Peter D. Blanck, What Empirical Research Tells Us: Studying
Judges' and Juries' Behavior, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 775 (1991); Peter D. Blanck et al., The Measure of
the Judge: An Empirically-Based Framework for Exploring Trial Judges'Behavior, 75 IOWA L. REV.
653 (1990).
38. Hams M. Cooper & Robert Rosenthal, Statistical Versus Traditional Procedures for
Summarizing Research Findings, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 442 (1980); LARRY V. HEDGES & INGRAM OLKIN,
STATISTICAL METHODS FOR META-ANALYSIS (1985); Frederick M. Mosteller & R.R. Bush, Selected
Quantitative Techniques, in I HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY AND METHOD 289-334
(Gardner Lindzey ed., 1954).
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The failure to emplQy meta-analytic procedures when they could be used has
important ethical and legal implications. In part, this is because the opportuni-
ty to increase the benefits of past individual studies has been foregone. In
addition, when resources are employed by scientists or court-appointed experts
to prepare literature reviews, it is fair to ask whether those resources are
being used efficiently or ethically " Now that it is possible to summarize
literature meta-analytically, it hardly seems justifiable to review literature in
a pre-meta-analytic, pre-quantitative manner.
In many types of legal cases, it also no longer seems acceptable, defensible,
or professionally responsible to present to a fact finder the results of
individual research studies that claim to contribute to the resolution of
controversy 4 This is most apparent in instances where the investigator or
expert witness has not already conducted a meta-analysis to determine
whether, in fact, there really is a controversy at all. To provide one example:
Currently, a new study of the effects of psychotherapy may not be worth
doing given prior meta-analytic results.4' Until meta-analytic work resolved
the issue, the question of whether psychotherapy worked in general was
controversial. It is controversial no longer.
Meta-analysis further helps to resolve courtroom controversies because it
eliminates two common errors, or misleading strategies, by social scientists
and lawyers in the evaluation and presentation of research replications. The
first error is the belief that when one study obtains a significant effect, and
a replication does not, there is a failure to replicate the particular effect. This
belief is clearly untrue. A failure to replicate is properly measured by the
magnitude of difference between the effect sizes (that is, the magnitude of the
experimental effect) of the two studies.
The second error is the belief that if there is a real effect in nature, that
each study of that effect will show a significant effect. Even if the effect is
quite substantial in reality, there is a limited chance that all investigators will
get results significant at the p less than .05 level.
42
39. Cf FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing that evidence may be excluded "by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence").
40. For example, does psychotherapy treatment work? What is the reliability of eyewitness
testimony9 What are the characteristics ofjurors' decision-making processes in death penalty cases? For
other examples, see Frank L. Schmidt, What Do Data Really Mean? Research Findings, Meta-Analysrs,
and Cumulative Knowledge in Psychology, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1173 (1992).
41. Gene V Glass, Pnmary, Secondary, and Meta-Analysis of Research, 5 EDUC. RESEARCHER,
Nov. 1976, at 3; MARY LEE SMITH ET AL., THE BENEFITS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY (1980).
42. For example, if the effect is substantial with a correlation coefficient of r = .24, and each study
employs a sample size of 64, we have the typical situation in psychology of operating at a power level
of .50. Given this typical situation, there is only one chance in four that two investigations will both get
results significant at the .05 level. If three studies were earned out, there would be only one chance in
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In these ways, meta-analytic procedures increase the utility of individual
studies by highlighting implications for how and whether significance testing
is performed and reported. Good meta-analytic practice shows little interest
in whether the results of an individual study are significant. Rather than
recording whether a study reached a critical level, say p = .05, two-tailed,"3
meta-analysts record the actual level of significance obtained. This is usually
done not by recording the p value, but by recording the standard normal
deviate that corresponds to the p value. Thus, a result significant at the .05
level, one-tailed test," in the predicted direction is recorded as Z = +1.645
(that is, showing the standard normal deviate corresponding to the p value).
If the result above had been significant at the .05 level, one-tailed, but in
the wrong or unpredicted direction, it would be recorded as Z = -1.645 (that
is, with a minus sign to indicate that the result is opposite to the predicted
direction). Signed normal deviates are informative to social scientists and fact
finders as a characteristic of the result of a study that is presented in
continuous rather than in dichotomous form. Typical null hypothesis decision
procedures are then seen more appropriately as a commentary on the state of
mind of the data analyst or expert witness. For instance, "I, plaintiffs expert
data analyst, chose to reject the null hypothesis." Defendant's expert data
analyst might not have chosen to reject the null hypothesis. In short, signed
normal deviates, as indices of significance levels, change the emphasis from
what the expert data analyst thinks or advocates, to what the study-actually
showed.
Getting rid of the dichotomous null-hypothesis decision procedure, and the
related state of mind, in the use of social science in the courtroom thus
increases: (a) the information value and legal relevance of a study, which, (b)
increases the utility or real-world usefulness of the study and, therefore, (c)
changes the cost-utility ratio and, hence, social scientists' and legal practition-
ers' evaluations of the ethical and evidentiary value of the study "
eight that all three studies would yield significant effects, even though we know the effect in nature is
both real and important in magnitude. See JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1988); Jacob Cohen, The Statistical Power of Abnormal-Social
Psychological Research: A Review, 65 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 145 (1962); Robert Rosenthal,
On Being One's Own Case Study: Experimenter Effects in Behavioral Research-Thirty Years Later,
in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE (W.R. Shadish, Jr. & S. Fuller eds., forthcoming 1993); Peter
Sedlmeier & Gerd Gigerenzer, Do Studies of Statistical Power Have an Effect on the Power of Studies?,
105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 309 (1989).
43. A two-tailed test is a test of significance in which the null hypothesis is rejected if the results
are significant (e.g., at the p < .05 level) in either of two possible directions.
44. A one-tailed test is a test of significance in which the null hypothesis is rejected only if the
results are significant (e.g., at the p < .05 level) in one of the two possible directions.
45. Getting rid of the dichotomous null-hypothesis decision procedure also rids us of the worthless
issue of one- versus two-tailed significance testing. As illustrated herein, the sign of the standard normal
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Another way in which meta-analysis increases research utility, therefore
furthering the ethical justification and evidentiary base of research studies, is
by providing accurate estimates of effect sizes. In fact, effect sizes can be of
major importance even when they are so small as to have r' = .00. When
well-estimated effect sizes are provided to a fact finder, it is valuable also to
assess their practical importance. The traditional r2 method of effect size
estimation does a poor job of this since an r' of .00 can, by way of one
example, be associated with an experimental treatment method that reduces
death rates by as much as 7 per 100 lives lost.46 Once social scientists,
lawyers, and fact finders are aware that effect size, where r values of .05, .10,
and .20 (with r2s of .00, .01, and .04, respectively), for example, are
associated with benefits equivalent to saving 5, 10, or20 lives per 100 people,
they may more accurately weigh the costs and utilities of undertaking any
particular study, as well as the ultimate value of the study
III. REPORTING SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
This final Part discusses several issues related to the reporting of social
science research. The issues raised relate to the misrepresentation of findings
and research credit and to the decision not to report or publish research
findings. This Part discusses the relevance of each issue to the use of social
science in the courtroom.
A. Misrepresentation of Findings
Mother nature makes it hard enough to learn her secrets, without the
additional difficulty of being misled by social scientists or expert witnesses
as to results that just are not found or by inferences that are prejudicial.
Although all misrepresentations of findings are damaging to the progress of
science and to the ability to provide justice in the courtroom, some misrepre-
sentations are more obviously unethical than others.
The most blatant intentional misrepresentation is the reporting of fabricated
data. That behavior, if detected, often ends the career of the perpetrator.
Certainly, however, there are less egregious forms of misrepresentation.
deviate tells the tail, so to speak, of the direction of the result. How fully grown methodologists can
argue over the use of one- versus two-tailed tests has long escaped the first author. Most psychologists
are quite capable of doubling a p value or dividing it by two should they want to do so.
46. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 37; Rosenthal, supra note 37; Robert Rosenthal & Donald B.
Rubin, A Simple, General Purpose Display of Magnitude of Experimental Effect, 74 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL.
166 (1982).
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Counsel at trial and fact finders should be wary of other more subtle forms
of intentional misrepresentation.
For instance, a more subtle form of intentional misrepresentation occurs
when investigators knowingly allocate to experimental or control conditions
those participants whose response is more likely to support the investigators'
hypothesis. Another potential form of intentional misrepresentation occurs
when investigators record the participants' responses without being blind to
the participants' treatment condition, or when research assistants record the
participants' responses knowing the research hypothesis and the participants'
treatment condition. Of course, if the research report specifically notes the
failure to run blind, it is no longer misrepresentation, but it is scientifically
unwise if it could have been avoided.
Various errors in the process of data collection can lead to unintentional
misrepresentation. Recording errors, computational errors, and data analytic
errors can all lead to inaccurate results that are misrepresentations, albeit only
inadvertent ones. Social scientists might not normally think of unintentional
errors as constituting ethical issues, except for the fact that errors in the data
decrease the utility and real-world validity of the research. This, in turn,
moves the cost-utility ratio to justify the research on ethical grounds in the
unfavorable direction. Some cases of misrepresentation (usually unintentional)
are even more subtle. The use of causist language, discussed earlier, is one
example.4
7
B. Misrepresentation of Credit
So far, we have been discussing misrepresentation of findings or the issue
of "what was really found?" Some discussion is needed also of the issue "who
really found it?" Where so many papers.in social science, and the sciences
generally, are multi-authored, it seems inevitable that there will be difficult
problems in allocating authorship credit. Who becomes a co-author and who
becomes a footnote? Among the co-authors, who is assigned first, last, or any
other serial position in the listing? In social science journals, such questions
have been discussed in depth and general guidelines have been offered.48 In
the courtroom, the issue is, "Who is the real expert?"
47. Even more subtle is the case of questionable generalizability. For a discussion of this, see
Rosenthal, supra note 37.
48. American Psychological Ass'n, Ethical Principles of Psychologists, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 633
(1981); AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, CASEBOOK ON ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS
(1987).
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It seems that lawyers who regularly employ and confront courtroom experts
could profit from further empirical studies in which authors, editors, referees,
practitioners, and professors are asked to allocate authorship credit to people
performing various functions in a scholarly enterprise. How much credit
should be allocated to the person(s) who came up with the idea, collected the
data, analyzed the data, prepared the first draft, organized the revisions of the
draft, and so on. It would be useful to fact finders, courts, and lawyers to
learn whether different groups of social scientists have different views of
authorship allocation, and the degree of reliability of such ratings within
groups. As a practical matter, problems of authorship are usually problems
existing within research groups. Problems of priority are usually problems
existing between research groups. 49 Answers to these questions also may
prove useful to lawyers seeking to retain expert witnesses.
C. Failing to Report or Publish
Sometimes the ethical and evidentiary question is not about the accuracy of
what was reported, or how credit should be allocated for what was reported,
but rather about what was not reported and why it was not reported. The two
major forms of failure to report, or censoring, may be identified as self-
censoring and external censoring.
Some self-censoring is admirable and often advisable. When the study has
been done badly, it may be a service to the science to simply start over. Some
self-censoring is done for these admirable motives, but it often seems a waste
of information. For example, some researchers believe that they should not
cite their own or others' unpublished data because the data have not gone
through peer review Consistent with the discussion above, we believe that
such data should be cited and employed in meta-analytic computations, as
long as the data are well-collected.
There are also less admirable reasons for self-censoring. The expert failing
to report data that contradicts his or her earlier research, theory, or even
values related to the trial outcome, is practicing poor science and poor ethics.
It is always possible to find or invent reasons why a study with unfavorabe
results should not be reported: the subjects were just starting the undergradu-
ate course; the participants were subjected to prejudicial information; and so
on. A sound general policy, good for science and for its integrity in the
courtroom process, is to report all results. If it is important enough to do, it
is important enough to report.
49. Further discussion of this issue appears in Rosenthal, supra note 37.
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There is no denying that some results are more ground-breaking than others.
If a new treatment prevents or cures mental illness, that fact may be worth
more space in prestigious journals than the result that a new treatment does
no good whatsoever. But that less thrilling finding should also be reported and
made retrievable by other researchers who may need to know that finding.
Both the progress and the slowing of progress in science depend on external
censoring. It seems likely that the social sciences would be more chaotic than
they already are if not for the censorship exercised by peer review: by editors,
by reviewers, and by program committees. All these gatekeepers help to keep
bad science from clogging the pipelines of mainstream journals.
There are two major bases for external censorship. The first is based on an
evaluation of the methodology employed in a research study For example, if
our hypothetical school study is flawed from a methodological point of view,
it probably should not be reported or given much weight in the courtroom.
The second major reason for external censorship is based not on an evaluation
of the methodology, but on an evaluation of the results. It is often said of a
study, "those results aren't possible" or "those results make no sense." Often,
upon examination of such studies, the results are indeed implausible. This is
a poor basis, however, on which to censor the results. Censoring or suppress-
ing results that are not liked or that are believed not to have high prior
probability is bad science and ethics.5 °
CONCLUSION
This Article has highlighted several scientific, ethical, and legal issues in
conducting, analyzing, and reporting social science research. An organizing
theme has been that the ethical quality of research is often not independent
of the scientific quality of research.5' We hope that detailing some of the
50. Robert Rosenthal, On Balanced Presentation of Controversy, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 937
(1975); Rosenthal, supra note 42.
51. The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently recognized this view, concluding that admissibility
of scientific testimony depends on:
the expert's ability to explain pertinent scientific principles and to apply those principles
to the formulation of his or her opinion. Thus, the key to admission of the opinion is the
validity of the expert's reasoning and methodology. The court's function is to
distinguish scientifically sound reasoning from that of the self-validating expert, who uses
scientific terminology to present unsubstantiated personal beliefs.
Landngan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1084 (NJ. 1992) (citation omitted); see also Caternicchio
v. Pittsburg Coming Corp., 605 A.2d 1092, 1094 (NJ. 1992), For a general review, see STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG, AM. BAR ASS'N & BROOKINGS INST., IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF JURY DECISION
MAKING: EXECUTiVE SUMMARY, SYMPOSIUM ON THE FUTURE OF THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM IN THE
UNITED STATES (1992).
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specifics of this theme has served two functions for social scientists, lawyers,
fact finders, and policy makers. First, we hope it has shown how it is possible
simultaneously to improve the quality of science and the quality of ethics in
the presentation of social science research in the courtroom. Second, we hope
that, in raising more issues than it has answered, this Article illustrates to
social scientists, lawyers, fact finders, and policy makers that, in the matter
of improving science and ethics, many issues are yet to be resolved.
